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Lawyers and the Practice of
Law in England: An American
Visitor's Observations
Introduction
Last year, under the auspices of the American Bar Association's Interna-
tional Legal Exchange Program, Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. left his
Washington, D.C. law firm to work for seven months in London with a firm
of English solicitors. While in London he worked on a variety of corporate,
commercial and litigation matters. Mr. Wilmarth's experience within the
English legal system has influenced his views on the practice of law in the
United States, and he will treat certain English legal practices and approaches
which he believed are pertinent to current developments within the American
Bar.
In this issue Mr. Wilmarth writes of the English legal profession as an
institution. In the winter issue, Mr. Wilmarth will review the rules governing
discovery and the recovery of counsel fees in England and will contrast those
rules with American federal practice. In the spring issue, he will give his views
on the current debate in England concerning the adoption of a written Bill of
Rights.
The views expressed are entirely Mr. Wilmarth's, and we hope they will
spark some lively exchanges with our readers.
F.S.R.
I. The English Legal Profession
Thanks to Agatha Christie and J. Arthur Rank, Americans know some-
thing about barristers and solicitors, but relatively few Americans appreciate
the significant differences between the unified American legal profession and
its divided English counterpart. In fact, the English legal profession has a
number of singular features which are interesting and relevant to discussions
on educational and structural reforms of the American Bar. Accordingly,
this article will consider the value of adapting some of these English ap-
proaches to the American context.
The most distinctive feature of the English legal profession is, of course,
the division between barristers and solicitors. Barristers appear before the
"Bar" of justice, hence their name. They are associated with one of four Inns
of Court (Lincoln's, Inner Temple, Middle Temple and Gray's), which date
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from the fourteenth century. While the national organization of solicitors,
the Law Society, did not receive a Royal Charter until 1831, solicitors can
trace their profession back to the sixteenth century.' Out of a total of 6,800
barristers, 3,800 practice actively. There are 30,000 active solicitors.
One may not practice simultaneously as a barrister and solicitor. The bar-
rister is an advocate in the higher courts, a specialist, and, quite literally, a
"lawyer's lawyer," because usually he can be retained only by a solicitor. The
solicitor, on the other hand, is retained directly by the client to act as a general
advisor. While solicitors do specialize, partnerships (firms of solicitors) pre-
serve the general advisory nature of their work. Barristers, on the other hand,
cannot form partnerships or firms although they can share "chambers."
Unlike the solicitor, the barrister has no contractual relationship with the
person he represents and cannot sue for a fee. The barrister's fee is theoreti-
cally an honorarium which the solicitor retaining him has an ethical duty to
pay, even if the solicitor is not paid by his own client.
In general terms, the solicitor conducts the day-to-day communications
with the client, informs the barrister of the client's desires and, in litigated
matters, takes discovery, interviews and prepares witnesses (the barrister is
permitted to interview only the client and expert witnesses before trial) and
advises the barrister on the facts. The barrister gives specialized advice or, in
litigated cases, drafts the pleadings, plans litigation strategy and acts as
courtroom advocate. This division of responsibility frees the barrister to ac-
quire special knowledge in a particular field of law and to concentrate on the
demands of advocacy.
While the barrister and the solicitor receive different training, each must
apprentice himself prior to qualification. A solicitor must usually have a
university degree, pass the qualifying examinations, and serve a two-year
period of "articles" with a practicing solicitor. A barrister must normally
have a university degree and, if his degree is in a field other than law, a one-
year Diploma in Law. In addition to passing the Bar examinations, the
would-be barrister must join an Inn of Court, attend a required number of
dinners at his Inn and take part in other traditional activities. He must also
serve a year's "pupillage" with a practicing barrister after completing his
examinations.
Most English lawyers find the required apprenticeship extremely valuable,
and if long-term practical experience before admission to practice is benefi-
cial in England, why not in the United States? The English experience sug-
gests that our law schools should seriously consider replacing the third aca-
'For general discussions of the history and present roles of barristers and solicitors, see Web-
ster, The Bar of England and Wales: Past, Present and Future, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY:
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES COMPARED 84-108 (H. Jones ed. 1977); Bowron, Solicitors
and the Law Society, id. at 109-124; Memoranda No. I and No. 3 submitted by the Council of the
Law Society to the Royal Commission on Legal Services (1976-1977); and J. Baker, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 65-77 (1971).
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demic year with a year of practical internship, perhaps along the lines of
Chief Justice Burger's recommendation of a year's internship for prospective
advocates.2
In assessing the educational program for English lawyers one must con-
sider the shortcomings as well as the virtues of its emphasis on practical
training. One problem, for example, is that prospective barristers find it
difficult to support themselves during their practical training. The Inns give
some limited scholarships and pupils may earn fees during the last six months
of their pupillage, but barristers do not pay a salary to their pupils who have,
after all, completed their academic requirements. This has left barristers
open to charges of favoring those applicants who have social standing and
independent means. In contrast, solicitors normally do pay articled clerks a
subsistence salary and are encouraged by the Law Society to pay clerks an
"adequate wage" so that "no one is lost to the profession because of the cost
of qualifying." 3 All this would suggest that if practical training is to become
part of American legal education, the American Bar must ensure that law
students receive adequate financial support during that training.
The division of the English legal profession between barristers and solici-
tors has understandably led to certain tensions. Despite a declaration by the
Bar and the Law Society in November 1975 that the two branches were equal
and that their work should be conducted on that basis, some solicitors still
complain that certain barristers behave as if they belonged to the "superior
branch" of the profession." Additionally, solicitors have requested greater
rights of audience in criminal courts (they may now appear only for limited
purposes), and in the High Court of Justice (for example, to appear on cer-
tain uncontested motions and to advise the court of agreed terms of settle-
ment between the parties). The barristers have opposed this request. Solici-
tors also consider the complete separation of qualifying programs for
barristers and solicitors to be unsatisfactory and unnecessarily rigid since it
compels the prospective English lawyer to choose one career or the other
before he begins his professional training. Moreover, solicitors criticize the
fact that most judges are drawn from the Bar.'
Nonetheless, most barristers and solicitors do not desire a fused profession
because they believe the advantages of the split profession outweigh its short-
comings. Most English lawyers contend that the divided profession leads to
the most efficient allocation of work and enables barristers to develop greater
expertise in advocacy. Another reason given for not merging the profession is
that fusion might place the leading barristers in the larger firms of solicitors,
'Remarks by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States to the American Law
Institute (May 15, 1978), reprinted in 9 ALI-ABA CLE REVIEW, Nos. 27 and 28 (June 30 and
July 7, 1978).
'Memorandum No. 3, pt. 2, submitted by the Council of the Law Society to the Royal Com-
mission on Legal Services (1977), answer X. 16 [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
'Memorandum, supra note 3, at answer 111.2.9.
'Memorandum, supra note 3, at answers 1.21, and 11.2.2.
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leaving smaller firms or individual solicitors without access to the best advo-
cates.6 American lawyers might question this concern, because a considerable
number of small litigation firms with highly skilled advocates have flourished
within the unified American profession.
Given the history of a unified legal profession in the United States, the
creation of a strict division between advocates and nonadvocates or separate
training schemes seems neither likely nor desirable. American lawyers have
long been accustomed to flexibility in their choice of practice and to equality
of status with their colleagues. They would surely oppose the establishment
of separate qualifying programs which would restrict their practice oppor-
tunities, and nonadvocates would certainly resent any attempt by advocates
to establish themselves as the more prestigious branch of the legal profession.
Nonetheless, the English model provides persuasive support for the pro-
posals of Chief Justice Burger and the Devitt Committee to train advocates
through a combination of law school clinical courses, practical internships
during the third year of legal study, continuing legal education courses after
law school, and postgraduate work with trial attorneys.' Such programs
should, however, be flexible, so that a law student or lawyer may qualify as
an advocate at any point during his career and so that a qualified advocate is
not precluded from the general practice of law.
While reform in the training of American advocates is needed, no such
reform will be truly effective unless American litigators change their priori-
ties. American trial lawyers too frequently emphasize technique, strategy,
and "winning" while ignoring whether their practices result in the fair and
ethical resolution of disputes and the avoidance of frivolous lawsuits. In
contrast, English advocates seem to adhere to a higher standard which places
professional ethics and the public interest above their clients' demands. A
recent English decision described the advocate's responsibilities as follows:
[Elvery counsel has a duty to his client fearlessly to raise every issue, advance every
argument, and ask every question, however distasteful, which he thinks will help his
client's case. But, as an officer of the court concerned in the administration of
justice, he has an overriding duty to the court, to the standards of his profession,
and to the public, which may and often does lead to a conflict with his client's
wishes or with what the client thinks are his personal interests. Counsel must not
mislead the court, he must not lend himself to casting aspersions on the other party
or witnesses for which there is no sufficient basis in the information in his posses-
'Memorandum, supra note 3, at answers 1.21.13, and 111.2; Webster, supra note 1, at 96-100;
Williams, Fusion: An Outsider's View, 74 GUARDIAN GAZETTE No. 12 (1977). (Author's Note:
Mr. Williams practiced for 13 years as a barrister and solicitor in Winnipeg, Canada, before
qualifying to practice as a solicitor in England.
'See Devitt Committee, Report and Tentative Recommendations on the Standard for Admis-
sion to Practice in the Federal Courts to the Judicial Conference of the United States, 79 F.R.D.
187 (1978). Judge Devitt has stated that his Committee has not proposed either a divided legal
profession or completely separate training programs for advocates and nonadvocates along the
English model. What You Need to Know About the Proposed Federal Practice Rules, 65
A.B.A.J. 60, 63 (1979) (an interview with Judge Devitt).
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sion, he must not withhold authorities or documents which may tell against his
clients but which the law or the standards of his profession require him to pro-
duce ...
[Alt present it can be said with confidence in this country that where there is any
doubt the vast majority of counsel put their public duty before the apparent in-
terests of their clients. Otherwise there would not be that implicit trust between the
Bench and the Bar which does so much to promote the smooth and speedy conduct
of the administration of justice ... '
My impression is that barristers do view their professional obligations in
these terms and are not willing to compromise their duties to the court, the
public, or their profession in order to advance their clients' interests. This
attitude accounts for the English advocates' generally high reputation for
integrity, not only before the Bar but in the public's eye as well.
And these high standards are not without tangible benefits for society. For
example, barristers take seriously the ethical prohibition against the prosecu-
tion of frivolous litigation. Accordingly, they usually advise against litigation
of marginal claims and recommend settlement of closely divided cases. To
cite just one year, in 1973 the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of
Justice recorded 56,990 cases which were not disposed of by default or sum-
mary judgment, but only 1,087 of these cases proceeded to trial.9
The ethical standards which our British cousins observe should be emu-
lated by the American Bar. Our current effort to improve the competency of
American litigators must be combined with a new emphasis on the proper
objectives and ethics of advocacy, not only because it is the right thing to do,
but because it is also the eminently practical thing to do. No single step would
do more to relieve the burden of litigation in our courts and to improve the
standing of the American Bar with the American public.
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.
'Rondel v. Worsley, [19691 1 A.C. 191, 227-28.
'Webster, supra note 1, at 97-99. The High Court of Justice sits both as a court of first
instance and as a court of limited appellate jurisdiction. When sitting as a court of first instance it
may be designated as the Queen's Bench Division (which handles trials in tort, contract and other
commercial claims), the Chancery Division (which is the court of original equity jurisdiction), or
the Family Division. When sitting as a court of appellate jurisdiction it is designated as the
Divisional Courts.

